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Abstract While some forms of public–private partnerships are a feature of hospital construction and operation in all countries with 
mixed economies, there is increasing interest in a model in which a public authority contracts with a private company to design, 
build and operate an entire hospital. Drawing on the experience of countries such as Australia, Spain, and the United Kingdom, this 
paper reviews the experience with variants of this model. Although experience is still very limited and rigorous evaluations lacking, 
four issues have emerged: cost, quality, flexibility and complexity. New facilities have, in general, been more expensive than they 
would have been if procured using traditional methods. Compared with the traditional system, new facilities are more likely to be 
built on time and within budget, but this seems often to be at the expense of compromises on quality. The need to minimize the 
risk to the parties means that it is very difficult to “future-proof” facilities in a rapidly changing world. Finally, such projects are 
extremely, and in some cases prohibitively, complex. While it is premature to say whether the problems experienced relate to the 
underlying model or to their implementation, it does seem that a public–private partnership further complicates the already difficult 
task of building and operating a hospital.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2006;84:890-896.
Voir page 894 le résumé en français. En la página 895 figura un resumen en español.
Background
The delivery of health care in almost 
every country involves some form of 
public–private partnership. In countries 
where care is delivered mainly through 
the public system, many inputs, such as 
pharmaceuticals and support services, 
are sourced from the private sector. In 
countries with predominantly privately 
owned facilities, the state influences 
their configuration through regulations 
and financial incentives. In hospitals, the 
situation is further complicated because 
of the many functions provided by such 
institutions: the training of health prof
fessionals and research and development, 
for example, are activities that are pubf
licly funded to varying degrees.1
However, even the concept of a 
public–private dichotomy is problemf
atic. States often limit the scope of prif
vate contractors to decide where to place 
facilities. Furthermore, there is a differf
ence between forfprofit corporations 
that operate hospitals as one business 
among many and notfforfprofit organif
zations (including religious foundations) 
that exist solely to provide health care. 
This paper will examine one particular 
type of public–private partnership — the 
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construction of a health facility and the 
ongoing provision of its nonfclinical 
(and in some cases clinical) services 
within a public system of provision.
Private provision of essential public 
services has a long tradition, especially 
in major infrastructure projects in the 
transport sector and in the provision 
of utilities. The private sector played a 
crucial role in developing these services 
in the 19th century but, in the postfwar 
period, many were taken into public 
ownership because of market failure.2
Privatization of public services bef
came more widespread in the 1980s with 
the emergence of a neoliberal consensus 
that sought to reduce the role of the 
state.3 In the health sector, however, 
comprehensive privatization was ref
jected because of the existence of market 
failure.4 Instead, various quasifmarket 
solutions were developed, typically the 
separation of purchasers and providers 
within the public sector.5 The logical 
next step was to move the delivery of 
health care out of the public sector. This 
was seen as a means to increase value for 
money, innovation, and responsiveness 
to users.6
The conceptual underpinning of this 
approach was developed by Williamson7 
and Ouchi,8 with Preker et al.9 applying 
it to health care. Arguing that the public 
sector is intrinsically less efficient and ref
sponsive than the private sector, Preker et 
al. propose a matrix with one axis defined 
by the degree of contestability involved 
in providing a service (i.e. ease of market 
entry), while the other is defined by the ease 
with which the outcomes of the service can 
be measured.
Where there is low contestability 
and problems of measurement then a 
service should be provided within a 
managerial hierarchy; conversely where 
measurement is straightforward and 
provision is highly contestable it should 
be purchased from the private sector. 
Supporters of this approach have striven 
to reduce barriers to market entry and to 
enhance the ability to measure quality. 
Yet the basic premise is not borne out 
by the evidence.10 Australian research 
showed that, after adjusting for case mix, 
public hospitals are more efficient than 
those that are privately operated,11 posf
sibly due to the more intensive managef
ment of patients in private hospitals.12 
A systematic review identified 149 
comparisons of forfprofit and notfforf
profit health facilities (of various types) 
undertaken over the past two decades in 
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the USA. Of these studies, 88 concluded 
that nonfprofit facilities performed betf
ter with respect to cost, outcomes of 
care, access and social mission, 43 studies 
found no difference, and 18 reported 
forfprofit facilities to be better.13
Public–private partnerships 
to build and run hospitals
The model in which a public authority 
contracts with a private company to 
build or run a hospital is, inevitably, 
seen mainly in countries with national 
health services. Various models have 
been developed (Table 1). Australia has 
the most diverse range of models, with 
differing versions in several states.14 The 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the 
United Kingdom is a design, build, 
finance and operate (DBFO) model. It 
has been the primary means of financing 
major capital investments in the health, 
education and prison sectors during the 
past two decades. While this arrangef
ment provided a source of much needed 
new finance, a great deal of this funding 
was “offfbalancefsheet” financing and 
did not appear in the government books 
as new borrowing. This arrangement enf
abled the government to remain within 
targets set for public sector borrowing. 
Moves by the British Office for National 
Statistics to redefine such expenditure are 
likely, at a stroke, to remove one of the 
main reasons justification for pursuing 
the DBFO model.15
In the British model, a company — 
usually in the construction sector — will 
create a “special purpose vehicle” to bid 
for a contract with a health authority to 
build and provide nonfclinical services to 
a hospital. The successful contractor will 
enter into three types of subcontract: one 
with banks to finance the project; one 
with a construction company to build 
the hospital; and one with a facilities 
management company to manage it over 
the lifetime of the contract, typically 30 
years. Over the lifetime of the contract, 
the healthfcare provider undertakes to 
pay a defined amount from its revenues 
and the contractor undertakes to mainf
tain the fabric of the hospital in good 
order and (depending on the agreef
ment) manage facilities. Similar models 
have been adopted, although on a very 
much smaller scale, in Canada, Portugal 
and Spain. It is also being introduced in 
Ireland and, while not yet used to finance 
hospitals, is used for procurement of 
other infrastructure in Greece.16
Franchising is an alternative model, 
where a private company takes over 
management of an existing public 
hospital. This approach has been tried 
in Sweden17 (including the sale of a 
public hospital to a private company) 
and in Italy. A unique model has been 
developed in the Alzira Hospital, in 
Valencia, Spain, which is managed by a 
private consortium that accepts responf
sibility for the health care for a defined 
population in return for an annual per 
capita payment.
There is still relatively little expef
rience with these models of hospital 
provision, and governments have yet to 
undertake rigorous evaluations. Thus 
the merits of these models compared 
with the traditional model of provision 
remain highly contentious but it is 
already possible to identify several key 
issues that have emerged. These are cost, 
quality, flexibility and complexity.
Key issues
Cost
There are significant costs not only for 
the firms bidding for a public–private 
partnership, but also for the healthfcare 
provider. Prospective bidders incur large 
costs in developing their tenders, and 
losing contenders must find a way of 
recouping their expenditure from subf
sequent contracts. A sequence of losf
ing bids by a leading British company 
involved in PFI deals led to fears of 
insolvency.18 Although the PFI prof
cess has been simplified by the use of 
model contracts and other measures to 
reduce the very high level of complexity 
— and thus the need for large amounts 
Table 1. Models of public–private partnership in hospital provision
Model Description
Franchising Public authority contracts a private company to manage 
existing hospital
DBFO (design, build, finance, 
operate)
Private consortium designs facilities based on public 
authority’s specified requirements, builds the facility, 
finances the capital cost and operates their facilities
BOO (build, own, operate) Public authority purchases services for fixed period (say 
30 years) after which ownership remains with private 
provider
BOOT (build, own, operate, 
transfer)
Public authority purchases services for fixed period after 
which ownership reverts to public authority
BOLB (buy, own, lease back) Private contractor builds hospital; facility is leased back 
and managed by public authority
Alzira model Private contractor builds and operates hospital, with 
contract to provide care for a defined population
of high cost legal, financial and other 
technical advice — the process remains 
daunting for parties on both sides of the 
transaction.
In theory, the British PFI model 
should contain the cost to the health 
authority by transferring risk to the 
contractors. But in practice, the corf
porate bonds used to finance PFI deals 
are typically awarded BBB+ status by 
financial rating agencies, just above 
junk bond status, while government 
bonds are considered less risky, and for 
many European governments attract 
AAA ratings.19 The consequence of this 
low rating is that the cost of borrowing 
money is higher than it would be for 
governments. A particular problem arises 
with the way that the risks of construcf
tion are bundled with those associated 
with the operation of services. Whereas 
construction risks may be high and quite 
real, the operation of services carries a 
much lower risk, not least because hosf
pitals are financially backed by governf
ment — i.e. the government is a single 
payer, meaning that income streams to 
hospitals are less at risk than in markets 
with multiple payers. However, some 
contend that several of the risks factored 
into PFI business cases are unlikely or 
notional and appear to be an accountf
ing device designed to favour private 
procurement in cost comparisons with 
its public alternative.20 The reason for 
this may have been a very strong signal 
from government that schemes relying 
on public funding rather than PFI were 
very unlikely to succeed.
The low risk once construction 
is complete has allowed advantageous 
refinancing of projects at lower interest 
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rates, with significant benefits to the PFI 
consortia. Such activities have attracted 
unfavourable comment from the British 
National Audit Office.21 Belatedly, the 
British Treasury required that new conf
tracts should incorporate provisions to 
share these profits between the contracf
tor and the public authority.22
The enormous size of some British 
PFI hospital projects has also been a cause 
of concern. Where this is the case, it may 
reduce the level of competition between 
bidders as there are a relatively small numf
ber of construction companies capable of 
undertaking very large projects and the 
bidding costs can pose a significant barf
rier to market entry. One factor behind 
the increasing size of projects may be that 
consortia have been unwilling to assume 
the risk of modifying existing buildings. 
Building a hospital around existing buildf
ings and services increases the risks and 
complexity of construction. Because a PFI 
contract is set up to deliver a single project, 
there is an incentive to load as much into a 
scheme as possible since additional capital 
may not be available in the future. Thus, the 
risks facing both parties are compounded 
as the schemes become very much more 
complex, less financially viable, and the 
ability to adapt flexibly to rapid changes 
in the healthfcare environment is limited, 
as we discuss later in this article.
The cost of annual charges for buildf
ings constructed under public–private 
partnership arrangements may be 
higher than the cost associated with 
hospitals built and run using convenf
tional procurement methods. Some of 
this additional cost may be justified as 
the National Health Service (NHS) in 
the United Kingdom has had a poor 
record of maintaining its buildings, with 
money meant for maintenance often bef
ing reallocated to provide services. PFI 
contracts ensure that money is put aside 
to properly maintain buildings. These 
charges have also focused attention on 
the costs of maintaining and operating 
buildings. The legacy of buildings that 
are expensive to run, clean, heat and 
repair is a significant problem to the 
extent that some hospitals constructed 
in the 1960s and 1970s have already 
reached the end of their useful life. 
Public–private partnerships can create 
an incentive for those involved in the 
construction of buildings to pay more 
attention to these issues.
It is difficult to make accurate cost 
comparisons between the costs of PFI 
procurement and more conventional 
methods. Pollock et al. have argued 
that privately funded initiatives are 
significantly more expensive than the 
conventional government funded arf
rangements for a variety of reasons, 
including the higher cost of financing 
associated with lower credit ratings.23 
They also note the requirement for prif
vate companies to make sufficient profit 
to return to their shareholders. While the 
British government disputes the arguf
ments against PFI, its case is weakened by 
the lack of transparency that surrounds 
these projects, which are deemed to be 
commercially confidential. Comparison 
between the two procurement models is 
also made more difficult by the need to 
take a lifefcycle view to accommodate the 
tradefoffs between higher initial capital 
cost and lower longfterm operating costs. 
Although the decision to proceed with a 
project should be based on a process that 
Box 1. Public–private partnerships facing financial problems
Alzira Hospital, Valencia, Spain26
In 1999 a consortium consisting of an insurance company, banks and construction companies was awarded a contract by the regional government 
of Valencia to construct a hospital to replace an obsolete facility. The hospital achieved high levels on standard measures of performance but was 
afflicted by poor labour relations. It became clear that the contract was financially unsustainable and in 2002 a refinancing deal was arranged, 
providing a substantial financial injection. The hospital is now working well.
Paddington Health Campus, London, England 27
A private financing initiative approach was chosen as the mechanism to consolidate several world-class teaching hospitals on a single site in west 
London. In 2000 an Outline Business Case estimated a cost of £300 million with completion by 2006. When the scheme eventually collapsed 
the budget had risen to £894 million, with completion projected by 2013. Preparation of the failed project cost £15 million. The official report 
highlighted the extreme complexity of the project, unclear lines of accountability and a failure by central government to clarify whether it actually 
supported the scheme.
La Trobe Regional Hospital, Melbourne, Australia28
La Trobe Regional Hospital was built by a private company to replace older public hospitals, having entered into a confidential contract with the 
government of the state of Victoria to provide hospital services for 20 years. In 1999 the hospital lost AUS$ 6 million and was projecting ongoing 
losses. The Victorian health minister reported that the scale of losses was such that the hospital could no longer guarantee its standard of care. In 
2000 the company was released from its contract in return for an agreement to drop legal action against the government. It sold the facility to the 
government for AUS$ 6.6 million (about half of its estimated valued) and made an additional payment of AUS$ 1 million.
compares the cost of a privately financed 
initiative with a public sector option, this 
comparison is not always straightforward, 
with the Assistant AuditorfGeneral from 
the United Kingdom National Audit 
Office describing this process as “pseudof
scientific mumbofjumbo.”24
Although this section has examined 
in detail the evidence from the United 
Kingdom, similar conclusions have been 
reached in an economic assessment of 
the P3 hospital financing scheme in 
Canada, which shares many features 
with the PFI model, including the sef
crecy that shrouds contracts.25
The costs involved in public–private 
partnerships have frequently been unf
derestimated. Box 1 provides examples 
of several projects that have encountered 
serious financial problems.26–28
Quality
In any procurement exercise, when 
problems arise there are tradefoffs bef
tween three variables: cost, time and 
quality. Traditionally, the priority has 
been to meet the specifications agreed 
in the initial contract, with a reluctant 
acceptance that the project may go over 
time or budget. For example, in the 
United Kingdom in 2001, 76% of PFI 
projects were delivered on time and 79% 
within budget, compared with 30% 
on time and 27% within budget using 
conventional procurement. With cost 
and time seeming to be fixed in the PFI 
model, concerns arise about the quality 
of projects, with many of the hospitals 
built using this model experiencing sigf
nificant problems (Table 2).29,30
It is important to distinguish bef
tween problems inherent in the PFI 
893Bulletin of the World Health Organization | November 2006, 84 (11)
Special Theme – Contracting and Health Services
Privately financed hospitals Martin McKee et al.
process and more general shortcomings 
in the mechanisms for the planning and 
procurement of new hospitals. It is posf
sible that some of the issues with PFI are 
a more general feature of the design and 
build model used in the United Kingf
dom, where public authorities, under 
pressure to outsource key activities, have 
run down their architecture and planf
ning departments. Instead of providing 
the contractor with detailed drawings, a 
broad specification, which the contracf
tor can then interpret, is agreed. This 
approach has led to a series of failures in 
several public sectors,31 but also in private 
sector procurement 32 where firms have 
also been under pressure to outsource 
core functions. The expertise on the clif
ent side of the PFI process is relatively 
underdeveloped compared with PFI 
consortia bidding teams. Whereas few 
health authorities will have undertaken a 
large capital development, the consortia 
will have done several.
A related issue is the bundling of 
design with the rest of the PFI process. 
Although taking responsibility for design 
has some advantages for the consortia in 
terms of being able to control the risks 
and costs of construction, design feaf
tures that benefit the user of the building 
rather than the operator may be less likely 
to be incorporated. Design elements that 
might create a more therapeutic environf
ment or an improved work setting for 
staff are not always implemented. The 
pressure to reduce building costs has 
Table 2. Quality problems experienced with United Kingdom private finance initiative (PFI) hospital schemes
PFI development  Problems29,30
Cumberland Infirmary, Carlisle •  Use of cheap components necessitating regular refitting
•  Maintenance costs 50% higher than projections.
•  Poor drainage and plumbing; and limited signage
•  Patients leaving the cardiology department must go through five sets of swing doors, even though 
most are in wheelchairs
Durham District General Hospital •  Pathology laboratory flooded three times in first 18 months, twice with raw sewage
•  Poor ventilation and air filtration
•  Fixtures and fittings are of poor quality; lightweight storage cupboards unable to take the weight of 
routine equipment
Bishop Auckland Hospital •  Opening delayed by 2 months for modifications
•  Generator and core electrical systems had to be redesigned immediately after opening
Norfolk & Norwich Hospital •  Negative pressure rooms were not properly operational for 2 years
•  Air ducting found to be lying in unconnected lengths
•  No ventilation in the kitchens so staff work in 30 °C temperatures (with 44 °C being recorded)
•  Delivery loading bays inefficient
Hereford Hospital •  Boiler house opened with no water treatment plant
•  Doors too heavy for the opening restraints
•  Three lifts had to be refitted within 12 months of operation
Seacroft Hospital, Leeds •  Mental health facility found to have breached “every section of the fire safety code”
given rise to several buildings that lack 
natural light and have other undesirable 
features. These shortcomings need not 
necessarily be a feature of public–private 
partnerships; rather they are a reflection 
of underdeveloped skills and an imbalf
ance of power and knowledge between 
client and contractor.
Flexibility
The delivery of health care is changing 
rapidly, partly in response to altered 
demands on healthfcare systems, such 
as shifting patterns of disease and risf
ing public expectations, and also in 
response to the opportunities offered 
by new technology.33 By contrast, the 
quest to minimize the risk to which the 
parties to public–private contracts are 
exposed has meant that the contracts are 
often specified in very great detail, with 
large penalties for introducing changes. 
This lack of flexibility has meant that 
the configuration of some hospitals 
has been out of date by the time they 
are opened. The problem is not unique 
to public–private partnerships but the 
rigidity of contracts makes the solution 
more complex. In England, the difficulty 
of inflexible contracts has become more 
acute as new policies, especially in health, 
have created a much less stable environf
ment. For example, there is currently a 
deliberate intention to shift care away 
from hospitals.34 What would once have 
been variable costs are now fixed, so the 
overall system has very little flexibility to 
adapt to the new circumstances.
Incorporating flexibility into the 
original design is possible without addf
ing costs for constructors or operators 
but it does impose additional design 
costs. There are few incentives for conf
sortia to build in flexible design solutions 
since the cost of future modifications fall 
on the client. As noted previously, the 
“big bang” nature of most public–private 
partnerships makes it more difficult to 
adopt the modular approach to develf
opment that would provide more flexf
ibility, although only issues that can be 
anticipated will be addressed.
Complexity
Although the use of public–private partf
nerships has been effective when used 
to finance transport infrastructure (but 
even here there have been some high prof
file failures),35,36 this success has yet to be 
repeated in the health sector. The chalf
lenges of implementing a public–private 
partnership have been greatest in the case 
of major teaching hospitals. These instif
tutions accept a wide range of referrals 
and provide services for various types of 
patients. As such, these projects involve 
many different types of stakeholders. 
They also require the active participation 
of universities and research funders. The 
difficulties in reaching agreement with 
all of these stakeholders, combined with 
the high costs of the projects, have led 
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Résumé
Partenariats public/privé en faveur des hôpitaux
Si dans tous les pays à économie mixte, on fait couramment appel 
à certaines formes de partenariats public/privé pour construire et 
exploiter des hôpitaux, un modèle de partenariat dans lequel une 
autorité publique passe des contrats avec une entreprise privée 
pour concevoir, construire et exploiter un hôpital entier, suscite 
de plus en plus d’intérêt. En s’appuyant sur l’expérience acquise 
dans des pays comme l’Australie, l’Espagne et le Royaume-Uni, le 
présent article analyse les résultats obtenus avec des variantes de 
ce modèle. Même si l’expérience disponible est encore très limitée 
et si l’on manque d’évaluations rigoureuses de cette expérience, 
quatre aspects ressortent en tant que critères de comparaison 
importants : le coût, la qualité, la flexibilité et la complexité. Les 
nouveaux établissements ont en général coûté plus cher que s’ils 
avaient été obtenus selon des méthodes classiques. Ils ont aussi 
une plus grande probabilité d’être construits dans les délais et les 
limites budgétaires prévus, mais ce résultat semble obtenu au prix 
de certains compromis avec la qualité. La nécessité de minimiser 
les risques pour les parties implique une grande difficulté pour 
réaliser des établissements «capables d’affronter l’avenir» dans 
un monde en évolution rapide. Enfin, ces projets sont extrêmement 
complexes et dans certains cas atteignent un niveau de complexité 
prohibitif. Bien qu’il soit prématuré pour dire si les problèmes 
rencontrés proviennent du modèle sous-jacent ou de sa mise en 
œuvre, il semble qu’un partenariat public/privé complique la tâche 
déjà difficile de construire et d’exploiter un hôpital.
to the collapse of a major teaching hosf
pital (the Paddington Health Campus) 
development in west London (Box 1).37 
Failure results in very large losses in 
terms of fees and prepayments. These 
experiences raise questions as to whether 
this model can be simplified sufficiently 
to be used for very complex projects.
Conclusion
The delivery of hospital care inevitably 
involves many partnerships between the 
public and private sectors. Here, we have 
examined the situation where public 
authorities contract with the private 
sector to run — and sometimes to build 
— a hospital.
The theoretical justification for prif
vate financing of public facilities, alf
though debated, has come to be widely 
accepted. However the practical results 
seem not to have lived up to what was 
expected from privately funded venf
tures. The new facilities have, in general, 
been more expensive than they would 
have been if procured using traditional 
methods and where the public sector 
does achieve a good deal from a privately 
funded development, it may have to pay 
more later to prevent the project from 
collapsing.
One positive finding is that, comf
pared with the traditional system, new 
facilities are more likely to be built 
on time and within budget; but these 
gains seem often to be at the expense 
of quality. The need to minimize the 
risk to the parties means that it is very 
difficult to “futurefproof” facilities in a 
rapidly changing world. Finally, while 
the processes involved in procuring 
standard general hospitals are now well 
established, the complexity involved is 
increasing, especially with very large 
projects.
Major capital procurement is very 
difficult in any sector. Examples from 
the defence sector offer many cautionf
ary tales and there are striking parallels 
between the difficulties being faced by 
those procuring a major teaching hosf
pital and the current procurement of 
two planned British aircraft carriers.38 
However, public–private partnerships to 
procure hospital services do seem espef
cially difficult.
Unfortunately, the debate on the 
merits of different approaches has been 
characterized by ideology rather than 
evidence, with a reluctance to undertake 
evaluations. In the United Kingdom one 
of the leading critics of the PFI has been 
subject to vociferous personal attacks by 
some politicians.39
It is impossible to say whether 
the model underlying public–private 
partnerships is flawed or whether the 
difficulties with such endeavours are 
the result of mistakes in its execution. 
One plausible interpretation is that the 
additional complexity of public–private 
partnerships makes all but the most 
straightforward projects just too diffif
cult. Uncertainty surrounding the role 
and value of public–private partnerf
ships in health care needs urgent resoluf
tion.  O
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Resumen
Alianzas publicoprivadas para los hospitales
Aunque en todos los países con economías mixtas surgen ciertas 
formas de colaboración publicoprivada a la hora de construir y 
gestionar hospitales, cada vez suscita más interés la opción de que 
una autoridad pública contrate a una empresa privada para diseñar, 
construir y dirigir todo un hospital. A partir de la experiencia de 
países como Australia, España y el Reino Unido, en este artículo 
se analiza la experiencia adquirida con diversas variantes de ese 
sistema. Aunque la experiencia es todavía muy limitada y no se 
han hecho evaluaciones rigurosas, han aflorado cuatro factores: 
costo, calidad, flexibilidad y complejidad. Los nuevos servicios han 
sido en general más costosos que si se hubieran empleado los 
métodos tradicionales. En comparación con el sistema habitual, 
los nuevos servicios suelen construirse respetando los plazos y el 
presupuesto, pero ello se logra a menudo a expensas de la calidad. 
La necesidad de reducir al mínimo el riesgo para las partes significa 
que es muy difícil crear servicios «a prueba de acontecimientos 
futuros» en un mundo en rápida transformación.  Por último, esos 
proyectos son extremadamente, si no prohibitivamente, complejos. 
Aunque sería prematuro afirmar que los problemas surgidos están 
relacionados con el sistema empleado o con su ejecución, parece 
que la colaboración publicoprivada complica aún más la ya de por 
sí difícil tarea de construir y dirigir un hospital.
صخلم
تايفشتسلما في صاخلا عم ماعلا عاطقلا تاكاشر
 ةزيمم ةرهاظ ةباثبم دعت صاخلاو ماعلا عاطقلا تاكشر لاكشأ ضعب نأ مغر
 ،كترشلما يداصتقلاا ماظنلا تاذ نادلبلا عيمج في تايفشتسلما ليغشتو ءانبل
 ةصاخ ةكشر عم ةماعلا  تاطلسلا  هيف  دقاعتت  جذومنب  ديازتي  مماتهلاا نإف
 ةبستكلما تابرخلا لىع دماتعلاابو .هلماكب ىفشتسلما ليغشتو ءانبو ميمصتل
 تابرخلا ةلاقلما هذه عجارت ،ايناطيربو اينابسأو اسمنلا لثم نادلبلا ضعب في
 لازتلا  ةدافتسلما  تابرخلا  نأ  عمو  .جذمانلا  هذه  فلتخم  نم  ةدافتسلما
 اياضق عبرأ  انل  تحلا دقف ،ًايلاح دوقفم مراصلا  مييقتلا  نأو  ًادج ةدودحم
 ماع لكشب لوقلا نكيمو .ديقعتلاو ةنورلماو ةدوجلاو فيلاكتلا يه ةيسيئر
 قرطلا  لمعتست  يتلا  كلت  نم  ًءلاغ  ثركأ  اهنأب  مستت  ةديدجلا  قفارلما  نأ
 نأ  دجن  يديلقتلا  ماظنلا  ينبو  ةديدجلا  قفارلما  ينب  انراق  اذإو  .ةيديلقتلا
 ةينازيلما نمضو ،اهل ددحلما تقولا في ىنبت نايحلأا بلاغ في ةديدجلا قفارلما
 .ةدوجلا في ٍصقن باسح لىع نوكي نايحلأا بلاغ في كلذ نكلو ،اهل ةددحلما
 ضرعتي دق يتلا راطخلأا نم نكمم دح صىقأ لىإو ليلقتلا لىإ ةجاحلا ستمو
 لىع  ةقفاولما  ةغلابلا  ةبوعصلا  نم  نأ  ينعي  اذهو  ،ناكيشرلا  نافرطلا  اهل
 نإف  ًايرخأو  .يرغتلا  عيسر  لماع  في  لبقتسملل  مئلام  لكشب  قفارلما  ميمصت
 نمو  .طابحلإا  لىع ةثعاب  نوكت  دقو  ديقعتلا  ةياغ  في تاعقوتلا  هذه لثم
 هلوح انتاسارد يرجن يذلا جذومنلاب ةقلعتم نلآا تلاكشلما نأب لوقلا ركبلما
 لىإ يدؤتس صاخلاو ماعلا  عاطقلا  ينب ةكاشرلا نأ ودبيو ،هذيفنت  قرطب وأ
 ليغشتو  ءانب  تايلمع  اههجاوت  يتلا  ةبعصلا  ماهلما  في  ديقعتلا  نم  ديزلما
.تايفشتسلما
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